A man who may be locked up for a murder he did not commit should not be allowed to challenge his conviction, according to Justice Antonin Scalia and his three most conservative colleagues. And three members of the Supreme Court seem to believe that most people jailed due to unconstitutional convictions should have no recourse to the federal courts. At least, that’s what emerges from a four justice dissenting opinion written by Scalia in a case dealing with the rights of state prisoners who may be “actually innocent” of the crime they were convicted of committing.
McQuiggin v. Perkins is a fairly unusual case. After being sentenced to life in prison for murder, Floyd Perkins spent years gathering three affidavits from witnesses corroborating his claim that another man committed the crime. Yet he sat on this new evidence for nearly six years before presenting it to a federal court. Justice Scalia’s dissent claims that a one year statute of limitations prevents Perkins from presenting six year-old evidence that he may be innocent. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s majority opinion holds that “actual innocence” may overcome this one year time limit, although she also requires prisoners in Perkins’ shoes to overcome a very high bar before their claims of innocence may succeed in federal court.
Beyond the narrow issue presented by this case, however, the final paragraphs of Scalia’s opinion — three paragraphs that conservative Justice Samuel Alito pointedly chooses not to endorse — suggest a massive contraction of prisoners’ rights. Earlier in his opinion, Scalia claims that state prisoners’ right to challenge their conviction in federal court was “radically expanded in the early or mid-20th century to include review of the merits of conviction and not merely jurisdiction of the convicting court.” This is likely a reference to a controversial theory, championed by a young future Chief Justice William Rehnquist and later promoted by a conservative law professor named Paul Bator, that federal courts traditionally could not overrule state convictions so long as the defendant enjoyed minimal safeguards such as “counsel to argue all his points to the trial court, [access to] the state appellate courts” and the ability to seek Supreme Court review.
Scalia’s final paragraphs claim that the practice of allowing broad challenges to unconstitutional state convictions, including cases where a state prisoner may in fact be innocent, was a “Faustian bargain that traded the simple elegance of the common-law writ of habeas corpus for federal-court power to probe the substantive merits of state-court convictions.” As Scalia warns, permitting state prisoners to challenge their conviction in federal court leads to “floods of stale, frivolous and repetitious petitions [which] inundate the docket of the lower courts and swell our own.”
Justice Scalia is correct that judges have to do more work if potential innocents are allowed to seek vindication. Unlike prisoners locked up for crimes they did not commit, however, those judges will also get to go home every day.